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I. Introduction: A Scenario
You are part of a four-man private security team contracted to
protect a merchant vessel against piracy off the Somali coast,
spanning 1800 miles.' You see what appears to be a "pirate"
vessel. In this case, it is not a skiff. Most acts of piracy are
perpetrated using fishing skiffs that are modified to attack

t Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law, Orlando,
Florida; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law;
LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of
Law.

tt J.D. Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law; B.A., Johns Hopkins
University.
I Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with
Recommendations for Action, WORLD PEACE FOUND. (WPF), Policy Brief #11, at 2 (Jan.
26, 2011).
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merchant vessels.2 Rather, you think it is a "mother" vessel that is
ready to unload a couple of skiffs with the purpose of attacking
your ship. You alert the rest of your security team, but not the
Master of the ship. You open fire and destroy the ship; you kill
the "pirates" on board and go to check on your success-only to
find that it was a legitimate fishing vessel. The question is-are
you legally responsible for the deaths of the persons on board and
the destruction of the fishing vessel and cargo? If so, what
national laws govern jurisdiction? Far fetched? Not at all.
This Article introduces the reader to the state of piracy off the
coast of Somalia with a brief history of the Somali situation. The
purpose of the Article is to examine the international rules,
national laws, industry guidelines, and current practices regarding
the engagement of private armed security guards on board
merchant ships. The Article also considers other counter-piracy
measures, such as the risk assessment procedures and other
guidance on the matter set forth by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).' The Article analyzes a sample contract
issued by the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 4
for private armed guards and merchant vessels that illustrates how
the parties manage their legal obligations.' The Article considers
the applicability of the Montreux Document6 to the human rights
concerns implicated in using private armed security guards on
merchant ships.' Furthermore, the Article notes that the great
reduction in piracy activity and the lower success rate of pirate
attacks have likely prompted the financiers bankrolling the pirates
to stop funding them.8
2 Barry Hart Dubner & Ritvik Raturi, On the Economics of International Sea
Piracy-A Case offHistory Repeating Itself 20 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REv. 745, 750 (2012).
3 The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with addressing
safety and security in the shipping industry. Introduction to IMO, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/About/.
4 BIMCO is a major shipping industry association that aims to facilitate

commercial shipping operations for its global membership.
About BIMCO,
BIMCO.ORG, https://www.bimco.org/About/AboutBIMCO.aspx.
5 See infra Part V.
6 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good
Practices for States Related to Operations and Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc A/63/467 (Aug. 9, 2009).
7 See infra Part V.
8 For more information, see Professor Dubner's article on the economics of
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II. Putting the State of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia into
Perspective
One of the authors was privileged to be invited to a three-day
conference at the Harvard Kennedy School on combating maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia.9 Specifically, the meeting was
called in order to brainstorm about the situation off the coast of
Somalia.'o The participants included former ambassadors, naval
captains, academic scholars, members of the intelligence
community, and representatives from the Department of State and
Joint Chiefs of Staff." The main discussion concerned how to
combat acts of piracy.12 At that time, in 2009, there had been 217
ships attacked by pirates: More than "22,000 ships passed through
the Gulf of Aden alone, and others traversed the wider waters of
the Indian Ocean with 47 successful hijackings." 3 More than $60
million was collected in ransoms during 2009.14 This was an
increase from 2008 when "only 111 ships were attacked, up from

piracy, which includes a discussion of the "pyramid scheme" in piracy financing and
how financial backers or "enablers" benefit exponentially more than the pirates
performing the necessary tasks for the piracy attacks at sea. Dubner & Raturi, supra
note 2, at 754. Stakeholders in Somali counter-piracy efforts have also recently been
invited to consider, "What is required to finally and conclusively break the back of the
piracy business model?" The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, in OCEANS BEYOND
PIRACY, at v (2013) (with data audited by the Baltic and International Maritime Council
(BIMCO)), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
View%20Full%20Report_ .pdf [hereinafter The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012].
See also Anja Shortland, "Robin Hook": The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,
German Inst. for Econ. Research, DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1155, 2 (2011),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract--1940271.
9 Dubner & Raturi, supra note 2, at 745.
10

1

Id.

Id.
Id
13 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 1. See also Carlos Lopes, Africa Needs Structural
Transformation Not Structural Adjustment, EXEC. SECRETARY BLOG, UNITED NATIONS
(UN) ECON. COMM'N FOR AFRICA (April 30, 2013), http://www.uneca.org/es-blog/africaneeds-structural-transformation-not-structural-adjustment#.UgObN2RVS3B
(reporting
that "[t]here were about 29 piracy attacks in 2009 off the coast of Somalia as compared
to 150 attacks in the Strait of Malacca in 2005[,]" and also noting the difference between
the perceptions regarding stability and economic growth potential between African and
Asian coastal States).
14 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 1. See also The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy2012,
supra note 8, at 3.
12
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approximately 50 in 2007."" In 2008, of the attempted hijackings,
32 were successful. 6 "Fifty-five million dollars was delivered to
the pirates for ransom in 2008.""
The sums paid for ransom alone are a fraction of the true costs
of piracy.'" The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) organization 9
notes that its ransom calculations include not only the monetary
sums paid directly to the pirates, but also the associated logistical
costs such as damages to the vessels, the cost of delivering the
ransom, and the labor costs of negotiators and attorneys.20
However, OBP further explains that because of the difficulty of
gauging the accuracy of the secondary, or intangible, costs of
piracy, they are not included in the statistics.2 1 Significant
intangible consequences of piracy that should be considered are
the loss of human life, the financial and psychological effects on
the victims and their families,22 the commercial costs for the time a
ship is out of service during capture,23 the impact of piracy on the
well-being of the people of Somalia, the consequences for the
economic development of the region, and the effects on the
international maritime industry.24
15 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 1.
16 Id
17 Id. In 2010 and 2011, the reported ransoms paid grew exponentially to $176
million and $159.62 million, respectively; in 2012, the ransoms paid dropped drastically
to $31.75 million-the possible reasons will be discussed infra. See The Economic Cost
ofSomali Piracy 2012, supra note 8, at 11.
18 "[P]iracy is not a purely economic phenomenon, and human costs abound." The
Economic Cost ofSomali Piracy2012, supra note 8, at 11.
19 OBP is a non-profit devoted to finding a solution to the piracy problem with the
involvement of stakeholders from the maritime community.
About Us,
OCEANSBEYONDPIRAcY.coM, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/about.
20 The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, supra note 8, at 3 ("In addition to
the ransom payment itself, the logistical costs associated with paying ransoms ... were
estimated at 100% of the value of the ransoms themselves, bringing the total cost
attributable to the payment of ransoms and recovery of vessels to $63.5 million in
2012.").
21

Id. at 8-9.
22 Id. at 12.

23 In 2011, the average time it took to negotiate a ransom payment and the release
of a ship was 178 days. Id. at 11. In 2012, the amount paid for ransoms decreased but
the average number of days the ships were held increased to 312 days. Id.
24 OBP notes that it is important to consider "the impact of Somali piracy on the
Somali people. It should not be forgotten that they are some of the biggest victims of the
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The 2009 conference participants realized that action would
need to be taken to combat the Somali piracy problem and its farreaching effects. 25 Developing solutions was challenging because
the coastlines along the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen total
5,510 miles.26 Only Yemen and Kenya, at that time, had maritime
patrol capability.27 Therefore, it was necessary to have countries
on those coastlines cooperate to form a naval force that would
counter the piracy patrols in this vast area.28 At the time, Task
Force 15029 was responsible for combating sea-borne terrorism
efforts in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman.3 0
The question on everybody's mind at the conference was how
to combat pirates.' Naturally, the first thought was to discourage
piracy on land.32 Aside from following the money that was
funding the pirates, suggestions by private security firms
concerned how to make ships harder to capture.33 It was agreed
that reasonable force should be used to combat pirate attacks.34
One resulting recommendation of the conference was that
lawlessness occurring off of Somalia's shores." Id. at 2. Trade-related impacts include
the loss of revenue at the Somali ports, increased costs correlated to price inflation,
stunting of the activities of law-abiding Somali fishers, and loss of tourism revenue due
to the perceived risk of harm in Somalia. Id.
25 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 3, 8-10.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id.
28 As mentioned in the introduction, the Somali coast alone is 1800 miles long,
requiring significant collaboration and resources to effectively patrol. Id. at 2.
29 Combined Task Force 150 is one of three task forces operated by Combined
Maritime Forces, a multi-national naval partnership.
See About Us, COMBINED
MARITIME FORCES, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/.

30 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 2. Collaboration among national navies to combat
piracy continues.

See About Us, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, supra note 29.

One

Chinese general visiting a multinational Singapore-led ship in the Gulf of Aden said,
"We share a common purpose - to defeat piracy and ensure the security of international
shipping. We also recognise the benefits of coordinating our efforts to achieve greater
effectiveness[.]" CTF 151 and Chinese Navy Cooperate in Counter-piracy Operations
in

Gulf

of

Aden,

COMBINED

MARITIME

FORCES

(May

27,

2013),

http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2013/05/27/ctf- 151 -and-chinese-navy-cooperate-incounter-piracy-operations-in-gulf-of-aden/.
31 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 3.
32 See id. at 4.
33 See id at 8.
34 Id.
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Flag states (or, if necessary, the ship owners or operators),
should issue rules for the use of force and escalation of force
policies. In that context properly trained sharpshooters, under
the direction of the ship's master and with clear rules for the use
of force, should be authorized to shoot when menacing skiffs
approach within 300-400 yards of a target vessel and present an
imminent threat to a vessel or its crew. Those sharpshooters
should be prepared to continue firing, if necessary.35
In addition, some less forceful deterrence techniques were
recommended, like forming defensive water curtains with high
pressure hoses or "hardening" the ships with greased hulls, barbed
wire barriers, and high-voltage fences. 6
The legal suggestions included harmonizing U.N. Security
Council and state rules in countries around the Red Sea, the Gulf
of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean, so that their rules
would be consistent regarding the use of weapons and the ability
to bring weapons aboard merchant ships at the ports.37 It was
thought that if weapons were going to be available aboard vessels
at sea to deter pirates, those ships would need the legal right to
keep those arms while in a refueling or discharge harbor.3 8
It was suggested that unifying the laws could help to update
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation3 9 and also expand the
35 Id. at 9. Rotberg notes that not every conference participant agreed with all of
the recommendations. Id. at 4, n. 2.
36 Id. at 9. Other less violent solutions, advocated by the International Chamber of
Shipping (ICS) include water cannons (sweeping in an arc across the hull), using ballast
pumps to flood the deck to create a water curtain, using blasts of hot steam, and spraying
anti-traction foam (that does not use up the ship's fire-fighting stock). Best Management
Practicesfor Protection Against Somali Piracy,ICS/ISF, Ver. 4, at 33-34 (Aug. 2011),
available at http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/bmp4-low-res sept_5_2011
.pdf [hereinafter Best Management Practicesfor Protection Against Somali Piracy].
Even more creative and less violent technology has been developed to fill the demand in
the counter-piracy market; consider: air cannons that shoot projectile nets to "trap"
vessels, extremely foul smelling sticky "skunk" curtains, and anti-pirate laser distraction
systems. Neil Ungerleider, Water Cannons! Lasers! Sonic Weapons! Fighting Somali
Pirates With Science, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1804176/water-cannons-lasers-sonic-weapons-fighting-somali-pirates-science.
37 Rotberg, supra note 1, at I1.

38 Id.

39 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222
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Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Suppression of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean
and the Gulf of Aden.40
Consistency in the national and
international laws to permit the use of weapons at sea and the
presence of the weapons in the ports would support the private
anti-piracy measures by merchant vessels. 4 1 Updating these
treaties would "strengthen international legal codes concerning
and permitting the prosecution of pirates and pirate financiers." 42
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 43 since
2009 piracy on the world's costliest seas has reached a five-year
low, "with 297 ships attacked in 2012, compared to 439 in 2011.
The worldwide figures were brought down by a huge reduction in
Somali piracy, though East and West Africa remain the worst hit
areas, with 150 attacks in 2012."4 The IMB attributes this drop
not only to the combined naval forces that are deterring piracy off
Africa's East coast by using pre-emptive strikes and robust action
against mother ships, but also to the presence of private armed
security teams and the application of the Best Management
Practices (BMP).45 In addition to the decline in piracy due to
naval efforts and private armed security, the IMB suggested that
the "hardening" of vessels by responsible operators also
contributed to this drop in sea piracy.4 6

40 Rotberg, supra note 1, at 11; Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the
Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean
and the Gulf of Aden, Apr. 3, 2009, Int'l Mar. Org. Doc. C102/14.
41 See Rotberg, supra note 1, at 8-9.
42 Id. Another proposal involved changing the rules to allow confiscating boats
clearly equipped for piracy. See id. at 2-11. It was suggested that specialized equipment
like grappling hooks, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, etc., could be
considered prima facie evidence of "piratical intent," which would create a legal ground
to confiscate the ships. Id. at 11.
43 The IMB is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce that has the
goal of combating maritime crime and malpractice. Internal Maritime Bureau, ICC
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb.
44 Int'l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Int'l Mar. Bureau [IMB], Piracyand Armed
Robbery Against Ships, Report for the PeriodJan. 1 - Dec. 31, 2012, at 24 (Jan. 2013)
[hereinafter IMB PiracyReport 2012].
45 Id. The BMP-4 is endorsed by international shipping industry coalitions and
international military forces. See Best Management Practicesfor Protection Against
Somali Piracy,supra note 36, at 72-85.
46 1MB Piracy Report 2012, supra note 44, at 34.
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However, even with all this optimism, the IMB points out that
Somali pirates were still holding 127 crew members through the
end of 2012.47 "Forty-four of the crew members have been held
by different Somali pirate factions for over two years.'' 48 The IMB
Piracy Reporting Center recorded a total of sixty-six incidents
worldwide of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the first
three months of 2013, which is notably less than the corresponding
period in 2012, when 102 incidents were reported. 49 Nonetheless,
in the first quarter of 2013, four vessels were hijacked, fifty-one
boarded, and seven fired upon; there were four attempted attacks,
seventy-five crew members were taken hostage, fourteen were
kidnapped, and one was killed."o See the chart below by the IMB
that graphically compares piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia
in 2011 and 2012."

Id
Id.
49 Int'l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Int'l Mar. Bureau [IMB], Piracy andArmed
Robbery Against Ships, Reportfor the PeriodJan. 1 March 31, 2013, at 22 (Apr. 2013)
[hereinafter I1MB PiracyReport 2013].
50 Id.
51 The Economic Cost ofSomali Piracy 2012, supra note 8, at 7.
47
48
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Only five of these incidents were recorded in Somalia for this
quarter, including the hijacking of a fishing vessel and its twentymember crew, who were freed by naval forces before reaching
Somalia.52 There were two vessels fired on in the Indian Ocean
and two attempted attacks against Aframax sized tankers in the
Gulf of Aden." In the first quarter of 2013, Somali pirates
continued to hold five vessels with sixty crew-members on board;
in addition, seventeen members were being held captive on land.5 4
Why the sudden drop in the acts of piracy off of Somalia? The
IMB refers to the amount as "significantly" reduced." The IMB
explains that
[t]he drop in reported attacks is due to proactive naval actions
against suspect Pirate Action Groups, the employment of
privately contracted armed security personnel and the
preventative measures used by the merchant vessels (as per
latest Best Management Practices recommendations). The
attacks will rise to past levels if the naval presence is reduced or
vessels relax their vigilance. 56
The IMB's cautiously optimistic reports emphasize that, "[t]he
threat of Somali piracy remains very present" and illustrates this
reality with reports of piracy like an attack near Mogadishu in
2013, which was successfully thwarted by the target ship and
naval forces."
Acts of piracy off the Somali coast have thus dropped to the
point where they seem to be under control.5' There are a myriad
of reasons for this result.59 However, it has to be something more
than a coincidence that the drop in numbers has occurred since
merchant ship owners have taken to hiring private security teams

52 IMB Piracy Report 2013 supra, note 49, at 22.
53
54

Id
Id.

55 IMB Advises Continued Vigilance as Maritime Piracy Attacks Decline, ICC
15, 2013), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/841-imbadvises-continued-vigilance-as-maritime-piracy-attacks-decline.
56 See id
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 See IMB PiracyReport 2013 supra, note 49, at 22.
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES (Apr.
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to protect their ships in passage.
In order to enable the highest degree of protection from piracy,
these security teams need arms on the vessels. 61 For example, the
Queen Mary II, one of the world's most recognizable ocean liners,
passes through the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and out towards
Dubai. 62 Even though the ship passes through these dangerous
regions, the risk of pirates attacking or succeeding in an attack on
the Queen Mary II is minimal because of the ship's counter-piracy
measures.6 1 It carries 2,500 passengers and 1,300 crew from South
Hampton to Dubai on the first leg of a world cruise.' The ship
itself is 345 meters long and fourteen stories high, and its
promenade deck is seven floors above the sea.65 It is fast, hard to
board, and on this type of passage, is moderately well armed and
carries armed private contractors when it passes through high-risk
areas. 6 To keep the counter-piracy measures in place and comply
with State laws at ports, ships resort to "creative workarounds."6 7
For example, on certain routes ships may have to pick up the
armed contractors from one State and leave them in another State
and/or strategically "drop" their weapons overboard.
Armed security contractors "routinely carry M-16 type assault
rifles and sometimes belt-fed machine guns, often picked up from
ships acting as floating offshore armories near Djibouti and Sri
Lanka." 6 9 What is behind the drop in Somali piracy is a matter of
debate, because the navies patrolling the Indian Ocean assert that
they finally have things under control.70
Sailing through the Internationally Registered Transit Corridor,
See id.
61 See Rotberg, supra note 1, at 9.
62 Peter Apps, Have Hired Guns Finally Scuppered Somali Pirates?, REUTERS
(Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/10/us-somalia-piracy-idUSBRE
91902J20130210.
63 Id
60

64 Id.
65

Id

66

Id

67 David Isenberg, The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies,
SOMALIAREPORT (May 26, 2012), http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3380.
68 Id
69 Apps, supra note 62 (emphasis added).
70

Id
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as you'll see, a protected route between Somalia and Yemen, the
QM2 passed warships from the United States, France, India and
Australia....
As well as the [European Union] force, there are separate
flotillas from NATO and US-led coalition forces that often
include Asian vessels. Several other nations, including China
and Russia also keep ships there, running convoys through the
"high-risk zone." 7 1
However, many remain dubious that this explains the fall in
the numbers of attempted piracy, or success rates in addition to
that.72 A more reasonable explanation seems to be that the use of
armed guards has become commonplace, particularly for merchant
ships passing through high-risk areas." Not one ship with armed
guards has been taken by pirates.74
On the other hand, piracy specialists and naval officers believe
that hired guards are too quick to pull the trigger, and have even
fired on innocent fishers from India, Oman, and Yemen.7 ' For
instance, in February 2012, two Indian fishers were killed by
Italian security guards, who mistook their fishing vessel for a
pirate ship. 76 The incident was blamed on the pirates operating off
the coast of Somalia, which caused security guards to be aboard
the vessels.7 7 The deaths of the innocent fishermen were a
materialization of the "worst fears" of those opposed to armed
security guards on ships.7 8 One British safety advocacy group
commented:
We have been warning for some time about the dangers linked

71 Id.
72 See Protecting Ships from Somali Pirates-The Navy vs. Private Security,
FORBES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gcaptain/2013/03/1 1/protectingships-from-somali-pirates-the-navy-vs-private-security/ (describing a security guard
company owner noticing that his clients needed more education about the support and
services offered by the naval forces).
73 See id.
74 Id (emphasis added).
75 Muneeza Naqvi, India, Italy Wrangle over Indian Fishermen Killing, CNSNEWS
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/india-italy-wrangle-over-indianfishermen-killing#sthash.mNSENwHA.dpuf.
76 Id.
77 Id.

78 See id

N.C. J.INT'L L. &COM. REG.
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with the use of armed guards on commercial vessels. The vast
majority of armed guards protecting commercial vessels are
extremely well trained and highly professional; but there can be
no room for human error when lethal force is used ....
III. Significant Shifts in the International Guidance and
National Laws
Before the IMO and various states became involved with the
legal issues of employing armed guards on merchant ships, there
were no existing standards or international guidance upon which
private maritime security companies (PMSC) could rely."o Article
92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea'
(UNCLOS) gives each flag State "exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas."82 Article 94 of UNCLOS refers to "duties of the flag
State."8
It is within the prerogative of Flag States to allow
privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board
ships and there are various laws that govern when Flag States so
decide.8 4 The competent State authorities that may exercise
jurisdiction over PCASP in varying circumstances include the Flag
States, the countries where the PCASP are registered, the countries
in which operations are conducted or managed, and the countries
where the PCASP may transit.85
The national laws regarding the use of PCASP are not
consistent and some nations still prohibit their presence on
79 Id. Additionally, there was a great disagreement about the security guards being
tried for murder in India, since the ship was in international waters with an Italian flag.
Id.
80 International Maritime Organization [IMO], Interim Guidance to Private
Maritime Security Companies Providing PrivatelyContractedArmed Security Personnel
On Board Ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.I/Circ.1443, May 25, 2012, Annex
[hereinafter IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP].
81 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
82 Id. art. 92.

83

Id. art. 94.

84 International Chamber of Shipping [ICS] & European Community Shipowner's
Associations [ECSA], Comparison of Flag State Laws on Armed Guards and Arms on
Board (June 2012), available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/ICS-ECSA%20Private%20
Armed%20Guards%20Flag%20State%2OLaws%2OJune%202012.pdf [hereinafter ICS
FlagState Laws 2012].
85 See IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80, Annex, at 1.
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merchant ships. 6 An article published on September 17, 2012, by
Captain Rich Madden, for example, indicated that there are many
countries threatening criminal and civil penalties for carrying
weapons on board merchant vessels for self-defense.
These
restrictions persist, despite the fact that Somali piracy off the Horn
of Africa has been "at least temporarily suppressed largely through
the use of armed security teams."" So, the first problem in
connection with conducting operations on merchant vessels
through various territorial waters is-how do you get the arms on
board the ships? In other words, what laws are involved in
connection with arming the ships?
The first option Captain Madden discusses concerns the time
when vessels approach the high-risk area.89 What happens is that
the PCASP fly out, join the vessel, and break out weapons stored
on board.90 The problem with "this tactic of having weapons onboard the vessel at all times, regardless of where the ship is
operating," is that ships potentially run afoul of local authorities'
regulations." The second option that has gained some traction is
the use of floating armories.92 In this case, a vessel such as a
converted oil field supply boat is stationed in the Red Sea, Straits
of Hormuz, or south of Mozambique, to provide passing vessels'
security teams their weapons.93 What does this avoid? It
eliminates the "issues involved with merchant vessels arriving in
the port with weapons aboard."94

86 See Rich Madden, The Armed Security Response to Piracy, and Some of the
Hassles, GCAPTAIN (Sept. 17, 2012), http://gcaptain.com/armed-security-responsepiracy/.
87 Id.

88

Id.

89
90

Id
Id.

9'

Id

92 Professor Dubner has previously recommended that a floating ship could try
pirates. Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster-Two Problems
That Defy the "Norms" of the InternationalLaw of Sea Piracy,23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& CoM. 1, 41 (1997); Barry Hart Dubner & Sara Fredrickson, On the Legal Issues
Regarding the Prosecutionof Sea Pirates (IncludingHuman Rights): A Case of History
Repeating Itself? 26 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 233, 252 (2012).
93 See Madden, supra note 86.
94 Id
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What type of issues are involved? Certain countries have
implemented regulations and/or procedures for dealing with
weapons entering in their ports. Captain Madden details the
following State regulations:
*

*

*
*
*

*

Egypt: Currently illegal to have weapons on-board while transiting
coastal waters or Suez Canal. In order to transit Suez Canal, the
offload of weapons and land transport to the other end of the canal is
required.
India: Weapons and ammunition must be secured in a locked weapon
safe when entering Indian territorial (12 nm offshore) waters. Vessels
transiting the Indian EEZ (200 nm offshore) and carrying armed
security must make reports to Indian Coast Guard and Navy. In either
case, a complete declaration of security personnel and weapons must
be made within 96 hours of entering Indian EEZ.
Yemen: Substantial "fee" normally paid by shipping agent to Yemeni
Coast Guard.
Kenya: Weapons required to be removed from vessel and stored in
armory ashore during port stay.
South Africa: 96 hours (4 days) notice required. Numerous ship
masters have been detained and charged under the Fire Arms Control
Act. Previously, 21 days' notice had been required prior to arrival
when carrying weapons for self-defense.
Venezuela: As per U.S. Coast Guard, "Vessels planning to enter
Venezuelan ports and carrying security weapons, are advised to
ensure proper registration and confirmation from the appropriate
Venezuelan Customs authorities prior to entry, and to heed any
concerns regardingtheir carriageby country agents."

Weapons and ammunition must be declared to customs
officials.9 6 If the master does not do so, he risks criminal charges
and severe penalties. 97 Therefore, Captain Madden suggests that
regulations and security procedures are essential for any deck
officer sailing in high-risk waters.98
The rules for the use of force by armed guards on merchant
ships are also those that are applicable under national law.99 The
shipowners believe that the guidelines set for the rules of force
95
96

Id (emphasis in original).
Id

Id.
Id
99 See IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80, at Annex I ("According
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (part II, section 1,
article 2) and customary international law, a coastal State has sovereignty in its territorial
sea.").
97
98
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should reflect the rights under most national laws for individuals
"to use reasonable force to prevent serious crime and their own
personal self-defence."' 00 This raises the question of whose
national law the ship must follow: is it the flag of the ship? If so,
the laws of the flag states differ radically - from the heavily
regulated to the unregulated.'o' Obviously, countries that issue the
most "flags of convenience" have an open registry or have very
little regulation, or they would not be used by shipowners.'0 2
Bulgaria and many other countries have absolutely no
regulations regarding the use of private security forces on board
merchant ships.'o3 On the other end of the spectrum, Japan
prohibits weapons and security personnel on board ships pursuant
to the national laws forbidding the possession of firearms and
swords.'0 4 In July 2011, the International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS) examination of Flag State rules revealed that in Belgium, it
was not per se forbidden by the Belgian laws or Belgian Criminal
Code to have private security personnel or weapons on board, also
noting that political discussions on the issue were underway.' in
February 2013, Belgium established rules to expressly permit the
presence of arms and security guards on board merchant vessels,
with requirements for vessel registration and for reporting piracy
and counter-piracy activity.1o' In addition to Belgium, the ICS
100 Baltic and International Maritime Council [BIMCO], Guidance on Rules for the
Use of Force (RUF) by Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in
Defence of a Merchant Vessel, at 1-3 (March 2012) [hereinafter BIMCO Guidance on
RUF 2012].
101 See ICS & ECSA, Summary of Flag State Rules on Arms and Private Armed
Guards on Vessels (July 2011), available at http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/
uploads/ukpi/Documents/Piracy/privatearmedguardsflagstateregs.pdf (charts with Flag
State RUF) [hereinafter ICS Flag State Laws 2011].
102

See INT'L TRANSP. WORKERS FED'N,

What are Flags of Convenience?,

http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm.
103 Id.
104 Id. See also ICS Flag State Laws 2012, supra note 84 (noting that the Japanese
Shipping Association has requested that the government "place public armed guards
such as the Self Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard on board Japanese flagged
vessels").
105 Compare ICS Flag State Laws 2012, supra note 84, with ICS Flag State Laws
2011, supra note 101.
106 AMBOS NBGO, Law Concerning the Combating of Maritime Piracy,
AMBosLAW

(Feb.

1,

2013),

http://www.amboslaw.be/en/news/law-conceming-

combating-maritime-piracy (noting that the new Belgian rules are temporary and will be
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notes that the following countries have changed their laws,
regulations, and/or policy to permit the use of PCASP: Cyprus,
Denmark, Greece, France, and the United Kingdom (modifying
policy recommendation from strongly advising against PCASP, to
recommending their use in the High Risk Area). 0 7 The regulatory
changes in these countries not only allow the use of PMSC, but
also formalize licensing and registration, set durational limits,
impose PCASP experience and expertise requirements, define the
status of the security guards as crew or "supernumeraries,""' and
require detailed reporting of PMSC.'0 9 The ICS has appropriately
warned stakeholders that the national "rules and regulations are
subject to change at short notice.""'
IV. Important Legal Issues Raised When Employing Security
Guards Aboard Ships
In order to see how the rules of force issued as guidance by the
IMO have impacted the shipping industry, BIMCO issued a
sample contract of employment for security guards on merchant
vessels."' The contract points out that it is important to comply
with Flag State law as well as any applicable local laws." 2 The
key issues that this contract addresses include standards to which
PMSC must conform in terms of providing adequate insurance to
cover their liabilities and contractual indemnities (which members
should verify), such as having in place the necessary permits and
license system to allow them to lawfully transport and carry
weapons, liability and indemnity provisions based on "knock for
knock" mutual allocation of risk principles, and, finally, the
Master's responsibility for the safe navigation and overall
re-evaluated in December of 2014); see also Insight: Piracy--GulfOfAden And Indian
Ocean, SKULD (Nov. 2013), http://www.skuld.com/topics/voyage-port-risks/piracy/
overall/piracyl/armed-guards/ [hereinafter Piracy--GulfOfAden And Indian Ocean].
107 See Piracy-GulfOfAdenAnd Indian Ocean, supra note 106.
108 See infra note 113 (regarding provisions in the GUARDCON model contract
for PCASP).
109 Baltic and International Maritime Council [BfMCO], GUARDCON Standard
Contract for the Employment of Security Guards on Vessels, at 3 (March 2012)
[hereinafter GUARDCON StandardContract].
110 See ICS FlagState Laws 2011, supra note 101 (noting this at the end of chart).
1"' GUARDCON StandardContract,supranote 109.
112 Id
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command of the vessel." 3
The GUARDCON contract is accompanied by a separate
guidance document entitled "Guidance on the Rules for the Use of
Force (RUF) by Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
(PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant Vessel (MV)."ll 4 It is aimed
at assisting Members with respect to establishing agreements on
the rules for the use of force that must form part of any contract
for the employment of PMSCs."' Members of Shipowners'
Protection and Indemnity Association should note, however, that
they are also required to exercise due diligence in following the
rules for the use of force by complying with the IMO/MSC
Circular 1405,'16 in addition to the Best Management Practices,
Flag State, and applicable national laws."'
The guidance on the rules for the use of force issued by
BIMCO for use by privately contracted armed security personnel
(PCASP) in defense of a merchant vessel set up guidelines for a
graduated response by armed security guards to any actual,
counter, perceived, or threatened act of piracy and/or violent
robbery and/or capture/seizure by third parties in order to the
protect the crew and defend the vessel from being hijacked."' The
113 Id. The contract also includes provisions as to permits and licensing,
investigations and claims (e.g., where a shipping vessel has been damaged or destroyed
because of security measures), insurance policies (i.e., the minimum insurance coverage
that the contractors have to maintain in order to cover their liabilities during a contract),
the main methods of employing security guards, and the payment fees, expenses, and
currency of choice. Id. at 8-12. The total cost of security guards and equipment for
counter-piracy measures was estimated to be between $1.65 billion and $2.06 billion in
2012. The Economic Cost ofSomali Piracy2012, supra note 17, at 18. For detailed cost
comparisons of insurance, security guard payroll, and equipment see id. at 31-34
(estimating war risk insurance costs to industry to be over $365 million dollars).
I14

115

BIMCO Guidance on RUF 2012, supra note 100.
See id.

I16 IMO, Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately ContractedArmed Security Personnel on Board
Ships in the High Risk Area, Annex 1, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 (May 25, 2012),
available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Doc
uments/MSC. 1-Circ. 1405-Rev2.pdf [hereinafter IMO Circular 1405].
117 BIMCO GUARDCON Contract for the Employment of Security Guards on
Vessels, SHIPOWNERS PROTECTION

LIMITED

(March

2012), http://www.shipowners

club.com/media/377127/bimcoguardconcontractfortheemploymentofsecurityguardsonve
sselsmarch2012.pdf.
118 BIMCO Guidance on RUF 2012, supra note 100, at 1.
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risk assessment by the shipowners is not to be used as an
alternative to the implementation of the current BMP."' The most
important item is again that only reasonable and proportionate
force shall be used. 20 That should be the level of response by
PCASP.12 '
It appears that the rules for the use of force follow the
guidance on graduated and proportional use of force that are given
both by the IMO and the principles set forth in the guidance
statement for BIMCO.'2 2 The force used must be necessary and
proportional.' 23 There must be a respect for human dignity and
human rights of all persons.' 2 4 That means that non-violent and
humane means should be applied first.'25 Examples of non-violent
measures that BIMCO's guidance recommends are maintaining a
physical and visible presence on the upper deck and bridge wings
to deter potential attackers; using visual warnings like flares,
lasers, and written banners; emitting sounds created by hailers or
long-range acoustic signaling devices; and, finally, showing intent
to use force by first using passive measures such as hoses or
releasing objects like nets and logs to hinder approaches of skiffs
while showing PCASP weapons and expressing the intent to use
them. 2 6 The cost of non-violent (or, less aggressive) methods for
the protection of merchant vessels is displayed in the OBP's chart
displayed below.' 27

119
120
121
122
123

124
125
126

127

Id
Id
See id
See id
Id. at 2.
BIMCO Guidance on RUF 2012, supra note 100, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Oceans Beyond Piracy,supra note 19, at 18.
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BIMCO even provides guidance for the types of fire to be
used, such as firing warning shots first, then trying disabling fire,
or when all other means fail, using deliberate direct fire against the
attackers.' 28 There is a discussion in the guidance document about
the use of legal force and that of opening fire on a person:
(g) Use of Lethal Force and Opening Fire at a Person
(i) Lethal force should be used only as a last resort and in
accordance with the principles referred to in Paragraph 5
above. The circumstances where lethal force in self-defence
can be used will vary. Such circumstances may include an
armed attack of an MV where the attackers are, for example:
(1) Firing directly at the MV or persons on board in
circumstances where the attackers have failed to heed
warning shots or other deterrent measures (assuming
there was sufficient time for such measures).
(2) Preparing to fire or firing at the vessel whilst clearly
demonstrating an intention to close with vessel in an
attempt to board, by positioning very close or alongside
and preparing climbing ladders for that purpose.
(3) Aiming, launching, rocket propelled grenade or
equivalent.
(h) If a PCASP opens fire the RUF should explain that only:
(i) Aimed shots should be fired to stop the attack;
(ii) No more rounds than are necessary should be fired in
128

Id. at 4.
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order to stop the attack; and
(iii) All precautions should be taken not to injure anyone
other than the targeted person.129
The standard contract itself (aside from the guidelines which
were just discussed) for the employment of security guards on
vessels suggests a minimum number of four guards on board a
ship.130 Why this number? Because it has "been proven to give
the best protection against attack because all quarters of the ship
can be covered and a proper around-the-clock watch system can be
maintained.""'
The content of the rules for the use of force is a matter of
national law, so it is obvious that there must be concurrent
jurisdiction between that of the flag vessel and that of the state
from which the Pirates came. 3 2 However, if an attack occurs in
international waters, there will be universal jurisdiction as the
piracy articles of the UNCLOS go into effect.'
Those articles
call for the arrest of any pirates on the high seas who are aboard a
private vessel attacking another ship.'34
According to the GUARDCON contract, "there is no
established 'best industry practice' in the maritime security sector
as yet" so contractors must "use 'all reasonable skill and care' as
the benchmark for providing the agreed security services."' 35 The
contract points out that the guards are listed as "supernumeraries"
on board the vessel in order to avoid issues in certain ports as to
the status of non-crew on the ship.'
If they were not listed as
supernumeraries, they might be considered passengers, which
could raise issues regarding their employment on board and the
character of their security equipment.'37
An interesting aspect of the contract is under section four
regarding the Master's authority and the division of
129
130
131
132

133
134
135
136
'37

Id. at 5.
GUARDCON StandardContract, supra note 109, at 4.
Id. at 1.
See id.at 2.
See UNCLOS, supra note 81, arts. 100-107.
Id. art. 105.
GUARDCON StandardContract, supra note 109, at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id
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responsibilities in a hijacking. The GUARDCON contract notes
that the "concept of providing the use of force, including lethal
force, in a commercial contract is unique in the maritime field.""'
At the moment, the maritime security industry does not have the
same level of security and level of transparency called for in most
countries for the use of force by the police.'39 The Master of a
merchant vessel does not have the necessary expertise to
command a team of armed guards in the use of firearms, so the
Master must set aside his judgment when a decision has to be
made about opening fire on the pirates.14 0 The contract raises the
question of whether the rules of engagement may be made
effective from the point at which the guards embark the vessel
until the end of the transit, because this would avoid any decisionmaking about who invokes the rules and when.141 In BIMCO's
view,
[T]he concept of effectively giving weapons control to the
security guards while the vessel is within the territorial waters of
a Coastal State would create many more legal and practical
issues than it resolved.

. .

.

However, experience of Somali

piracy attacks indicate that with vigilant bridge and security
teams there is always forewarning of an attack and therefore
there should always be time for the guards to make the bridge
team aware of their intentions.142
The guidance reinforces the importance of employing a
graduated and proportional response to a threat.143 The Master
cannot order a guard to shoot because the decision is allocated to
each of the security guards alone.144 It is thought that the Master is
unlikely to be exposed to any criminal action at a later date if the
private security guards make the legal decision. 14' However, the
Master does retain the right under all circumstances to order the

138

Id (emphasis added).

139

Id

140

I41

Id. at 6.
GUARDCON StandardContract,supra note 109, at 7.

142

Id.

143

See id.
Id.
Id. at 7.

144
145
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guards to stop firing. 146
The IMO is very much concerned with the fact that the PMSC
have awareness and understanding of the applicable laws of flag,
port, and coastal states with respect to transport, carriage, storage,
the use of firearms and security-related equipment, and the use of
force.147 The IMO issued a "Questionnaire on Information on Port
and Coastal State Requirements Related to Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships," which is included as
an annex to this Article so that the reader can see questions
regarding the entry of ships into ports, anchorages, roadstead or
off-shore terminals when carrying firearms and/or security-related
equipment and/or PCASP.148
Among others inquiries, the
questionnaire asks if specific notification is required from ships
intending to enter or depart from ports.149 There are two sample
responses in the annex, one by the government of Australia and
one by the government of Denmark.'
The questionnaire sets
forth the entry requirements that the shipowner should consider
when entering a port regarding the carrying of firearms on board
ships, security-related equipment, a place for ships carrying
firearms when transiting through the territorial waters of
contiguous states, such as Australia or Denmark, allowing of
embarkation and disembarkation of firearms, equipment in their
ports, and the relevant requirements where there is import or

146

Id
147 IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80, Annex, at 3. There is a large
section seven in the contract entitled "Legal and Liabilities." However, this is more in
line with a discussion of indemnification in case of negligence by the security
contractors. Compare GUARDCON Standard Contract, supra note 109, at 10-11
(discussing the contractors' indemnity), with IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra
note 80, Annex, at 3 (noting PMSC should understand all applicable laws).
148 See IMO, Questionnaire on Information on Port and Coastal State
Requirements Related to Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board
Ships, MSC-FAL. 1/Circ.2 (Sept. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Questionnaireon Information on
Port and CoastalState Requirements].
149

Id, Annex, at 1.

150 See IMO, Questionnaire on Information on Port and Coastal State
Requirements Related to Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board
Ships: Denmark; IMO, Response by the Government ofAustralia to MSC-FLL.lCirc.2 of
22 September 2011: Questionnaire on Information on Port and Coastal State
Requirements Related to Privately ContractedArmed Security Personnelon Board Ships
(published in Annex, infra p. 130) (on file with N.C. J. Int'l L & Com. Reg.).
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arrival and/or export or departure from their territory of firearms
and/or security-related equipment for use by PCASP.'
Shipowners navigate a challenging range of legal
considerations when establishing their counter-piracy measures
because of the absence of formal updates to applicable
international regulations, complex industry self-regulation, and the
disparate national laws and standards regarding the use of armed
guards and the presence of weapons on board ships. 5 2 Many
nations, following the IMO interim guidance and industry
guidelines, are adopting national laws to clarify the legal
ramifications of counter-piracy measures.'5 3 Although progress
has been made, the international rules and national laws are still
far from being harmonized and many State prohibitions against the
presence of PCASP and weapons still exist.15 4 Nevertheless,
shipowners increasingly rely on PCASP to protect their vessels
from pirates and the effectiveness of PCASP is being validated by
the reduction in incidents of piracy.'
V. Human Rights Considerations on the Use of PCASP
Whether the Montreux Document on Munition Pertinent
International Legal Obligations Good Practices (GP) for States
related to Operations, Private, Military and Security Companies
during Armed Conflict applies to the use of PCASP on merchant
ships has been raised as a legal issue by many concerned about the
potential for human rights violations in the conflicts between
armed guards and pirates at sea.'5 6 The IMO considers the

151 Questionnaireon Information on Port and Coastal State Requirements, supra
note 148, Annex, at 1-3.
152
IMO Circular 1405, supra note 116, Annex, at 1.
153 See AMBOS NBGO, supra note 106 (describing a new Belgian law for ships
sailing under the Belgian flag).
154 See Matteo Crippa, Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel and
Counter-Piracy:Is France at a Turning Point?, COMMUNIS HosTIs OMNIUM (Apr. 17,
2012), http://piracy-law.com/2012/04/17/privately-contracted-armed-security-personneland-counter-piracy-is-france-at-a-turning-point/ (stating that there is no consensus
among European states and the United States about the use of PCASP on merchant ships
and that France, among others, opposes their use).
155 Protecting Ships from Somali Pirates-The Navy vs. Private Security, supra
note 72.
156
IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80, Annex, at 2.
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International Code of Conduct for private security service
providers (ICoC) to provide "useful reference points" for the
PMSC, but notes that the ICoC "[is] not directly relevant to the
situation of piracy and armed robbery in the maritime domain and
do[es] not provide sufficient guidance for PMSC."'"' The ICoC
sets forth a set of principles for private security companies and the
Montreux Document reaffirms the obligation of States to ensure
that private military and security companies operating in armed
conflicts comply with the international humanitarian and human
rights requirements. 58 However, the IMO considers both of these
documents inapplicable because, in the case of the Montreux
Document, it applies only during "armed conflict," and in the case
of the ICoC, it only
identifies a set of principles and processes for private security
service providers related to support for the rule of law and
respect for human rights, but is written in the context of selfregulation and only for land-based security companies, and is
therefore not directly applicable to the peculiarities of deploying
armed guards on-board merchant ships to protect against acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea.159
At least one scholar has taken serious issue with this view of
The
whether the document applies to "armed conflict."'
argument set forth in his article is that there have been "serious
concerns that over 'frequent reports of security contractors'
impunity for ... human right abuses, criminal conduct or
aggressive behavior."' 61 The article also asserts that the "chief
objection shared by the IMO and the IMB is the fear that the
placement of PMSC personnel aboard commercial vessels will
escalate the level of violence pirates employ when attempting to
take a ship." 62 The efforts of the international maritime industry

157
158
159

Id
Id.
Id.

160 Joel Christopher Coito, Pirates vs. Private Security: Commercial Shipping, the
Montreux Document, and the Battle for the Gulf of Aden, 101 CAL. L. REv. 173, 174
(2013).
161 Id. at 177 (quoting E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern
Private Security Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law
Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 221 (2008)).
162

Id at 181-82 (citing Katharine Houreld, AP IMPACT: Security Firms Join
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to address the increasing losses from piracy since 2009, the
implementation of the counter-piracy actions described above, and
the accelerated correlated shifts in the piracy statistics have largely
displaced the views expressed in the article.' 6 3 In fact, in April
2013, IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan expressly advised that
merchant vessels should not "relax their vigilance," which
includes utilizing PCASP and other counter-piracy protective
measures, otherwise the problem may resurface."
In addition, it is quite obvious that the IMO has set forth rules
of engagement and has clearly enunciated them in order to make
certain that the contracts between ship owners and security guards
take into account not only the risk assessments but also the
graduated use of force against pirates so that such situations can be
avoided.165 A representative of an oil company predicted that "the
use of armed guards is likely to lead to significant increased risk of
personal-injury, fire and explosion, [and] risk of escalation of
conflict, particularly as Pirates will assume all vessels are armed
and attack tempo will increase accordingly. ... 66 However, that
has not proven to be the case.'16 Yes, occasionally a fishing skiff
is fired upon, but there has been no marked increase in or tactical
escalation of violence.'16
In fact, pirate attacks on merchant
vessels have diminishedsignificantly.'6 9 The predicted increase in
Somali Piracy Fight, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/world/2008-10-26-2583935117_x.htm). However, the IMB serves an important
role as the self-declared "world's premier independent crime-fighting watchdog for
international trade."

Int'l Crime Services, INT'L MARITIME BUREAU, http://www.icc-

ccs.org/icc/imb. See also IMB Advises Continued Vigilance as Maritime Piracy Attacks
Decline, supra note 55.
163 Compare Coito, supra note 160, at 174, 177 (quoting and citing articles from
2008 to glean the stance of the IMB and IMO on maritime use of PMSC by merchants),
with IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80.
164 IMB Advises Continued Vigilance as Maritime Piracy Attacks Decline, supra
note 55.
165 See generally IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80.
166 Coito, supra note 160, at 183.
167 See generally The Economic Cost ofSomali Piracy 2012, supra note 8.
168 See discussion above regarding the drop in piracy attacks from 2011 through the
first quarter of 2013. IMB Piracy Report 2013, supra note 49; IMB Piracy Report 2012,
supra note 44.
169 Sunil K. Vaidya, Piracy Incidents Decline in GulfofAden, GULF NEWS (Oct. 4,
2012), http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/piracy-incidents-decline-in-gulf-of-aden-1.1
085059; Jim Michaels, Somali Pirate Attacks Plummet, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2012,
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the frequency of attacks has not really occurred.170
While the problem of overbearance against pirates by security
guards has not really been seen in newspapers or elsewhere, one
answer to the concern that using PMSC will escalate the intensity
of armed conflicts is that the types of weapons that the pirates use
already include rocket launchers, automatic weapons, rifles, and
pistols."' These are supplied by their financial backers.'72
The main purpose of the Montreux Document in 2008 was to
address the responsibilities of States contracting with PMSC in
territorial armed conflicts."' The original document "does not
specifically mention or address employment of PMSC's on
ships."l 74 In August 2009, the International Committee for the
Red Cross (ICRC) released a new publication of the Montreux
Document with a foreword and annex that officially explain and
dispel some of the enigmatic interpretations and misconceptions
about its applicability."' The ICRC first clarified that "[njeither
NGOs nor companies can join the Montreux Document officially
(as it is the outcome of an initiative primarily aimed at recalling
State responsibility), but they are encouraged to use it as a
reference in their own relations with PMSCs."' 7 6 Then, the ICRC
specifically addressed the applicability to PMSC on merchant
vessels:
The Montreux Document, in line with international
humanitarian law, was written bearing in mind that PMSCs
operate in an armed conflict environment. However, it is also
meant to provide practical guidance in other contexts (see
paragraph 5 of its preface). A current example is the contracting
of PMSCs to protect merchant shipping against acts of piracy.
Even if fighting piracy is best understood as a matter of law
6:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/20/piracy-somalia/l781
929/.
170 Vaidya, supra note 169; Michaels, supra note 169.
171 Escalation at Sea: Somali Piracy and Private Security Companies, SMALL
ARMs SURVEY2012, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2012/
eng/Small-Arms-Survey-2012-Chapter-6-summary-EN.pdf.
172 See Dubner & Raturi, supra note 2, at 5.
173 Montreux Document, supranote 6, at 5-6.
174 Coito, supra note 160, at 196.
175 Montreux Document supra note 6, at 4.
176 Id. at 4.
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enforcement (and not of armed conflict), the Montreux
Document's statements on jurisdiction remain pertinent
reading. 177

The Montreux Document acknowledges that it is a legally
nonbinding document, even to the signatory nations."' The most
realistic current "view of governments engaged in counter-piracy
activity is that they are performing a law-enforcement operation to
which the international law of human rights has little
application."l 79 Thus, it is the current and changing national laws
governing PMSC (for example in countries like Belgium and
Greece where recent enactments aim to regulate the use of PMSC
on shipping vessels) that will continue to provide the legal human
rights obligations of the PMSC and their merchant ships.
However, in looking at the IMO guidance documents as well
as the guidance documents of private contractors, it is obvious that
they are extremely concerned with the human rights of everybody
involved.'" Otherwise, they would not have taken pains to set
forth risk assessments, gradual nonviolence, and graduated violent
reactions to certain types of pirate situations. As of October 4,
2012, there had been no successful attacks against merchant ships
carrying armed guards on board their vessels."' It seems the
financial backers have decided that it is not worthwhile to fund
this type of piracy off the coast of Somalia.18 2
As one scholar notes, "a recent update from the military
provided an interesting breakdown of statistics that have been
disclosed by the 80% of ships" transiting the East African coast
that are registered with the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of
Africa (MSCHOA) and have completed the comprehensive
registration form."' "In general terms, of the 80% of the transiting
Id.at 39.
Id. at 9.
179 Coito, supra note 160, at 208.
180 See, e.g., IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80.
181 Vaidya, supra note 169.
182 See Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, THE ECONOMIST
(Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21588942-newstudy-reveals-how-somali-piracy-financed-more-sophisticated-you; Abdi Guled & Jason
177
178

Straziuso, For Somali Pirates, Party Seems to be Over, TWIN CITIES PIONEER (Sep. 12,

2012), http://www.twincities.com/ci_21655783/somali-pirates-party-seems-be-over.
183 Stephen
Askins, Herd Immunity, INCE & Co (Mar. 15, 2013),
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ships: 65% of vessels have a citadel, 35% have armed guards, 3%
use the Group Transit Scheme (GTS) in the Gulf of Aden, and
something less than that follow a convoy."'l84
Interestingly, the citadel and armed guards figures have held
steady over the past six months, despite the perception that the
threat has decreased markedly. There are, of course, some
unknowns here in the sense that the non-registering 20% of
ships may have all been carrying armed guards and now
don't. . . .'

The interim guidance and recommendations provided by the
IMO are not intended to endorse or institutionalize the use of
Therefore, they do not represent any
armed guards.'"'
fundamental change in policy by the IMO in this regard. It is for
each Flag State, individually, to decide whether or not PCASP
should be authorized for use on-board ships flying their flag.'87 If
a Flag State decides to permit this practice, then it is up to that
State to determine the conditions under which authorization will
be granted.'
One article questioning the humanitarian treatment of pirates
by PMSC starts with the example of "[t]he first recorded death of
a pirate at the hands of [PMSC]" on the Panamanian-flagged
Motor Vessel Almezaan in March of 2010, which occurred in
response to pirates initiating an attack on the vessel with AK47s.' While the loss of human life is always tragic, the Almezaan
incident was clearly "self-defense" of the merchant vessel and,
additionally, the response and capture of the pirates was
coordinated with military forces of the EU. 90 Contrast the human
rights implications of the 2010 conflict with the following tragic
piracy attack that finally concluded in 2012:
http://incelaw.com/ourpeople/stephen-askins/blog/herd-immunity.
184
185

Id
Id

See IMO Interim Guidance for PCASP, supra note 80, Annex, at 6 ("An armed
team should only be seen as a supplement to full BMP implementation and in no way
replaces the need for BMP to be implemented.").
187 See UNCLOS, supra note 81, arts. 91, 92.
186

Id
189 Coito, supra note 160, at 176. A European Union (EU) helicopter detained the
six out of seven pirates who were not killed. Id.
190 See id
188
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Until recently, the longest ongoing hijacking and ransom
incident was the now infamous Iceberg I. The Panama-flagged
RO/RO vessel and its 24 member crew were hijacked in March
of 2010. Over the course of their nearly 3 years in captivity, the
crew was reported to have suffered severe psychological and
physical abuse. One crew member was also said to have
committed suicide by jumping overboard in October of 2010.
The remaining crew members and the vessel were freed in late
December 2012 following a rescue operation launched by
Puntland's Maritime Police Force.191
There are humanitarian concerns with every incident of piracy
and counter-piracy, but the defensive measures, and graduated
responses, employed by the PMSC on merchant ships are likely
preferable to the alternative.
VI. Conclusion
The main practical problems with employing PCASP on ships
are whether or not the private security guards are employing undue
force and whether they are effective in controlling acts of piracy.
The immense reduction in piracy off the coast of Somalia indicates
that PCASP are having a positive impact in eliminating the piracy
problems and reducing the risks of transit in the area.192 Although
some incidents and critics of PCASP raise the issue of human
rights, the applicable national laws in an encounter, the
international guidance on the use of PCASP, and the industry
BMP emphasize the importance of using nonviolent measures in
addition to armed guards and ensuring the use of force is
graduated and proportional.
This Article began with the hypothetical scenario of security
guards opening fire and destroying a suspicious skiff/ship, killing
the pirates on-board, and then subsequently finding that it had
been a "legitimate" fishing vessel. This scenario raised the
question of whether the security guards and/or ship captain could
be held legally responsible for the deaths and destruction. The
answer is yes, but the more fundamental question is not whether
they are responsible, but rather who will assume jurisdiction.19
The Economic Cost ofSomali Piracy2012, supra note 8, at 12.
192 Vaidya, supra note 169; Michaels, supra note 169.
191

193 One problem with assessing the question of jurisdiction is that it is likely that no
one will know about incidents at sea other than the security guards and the master of the
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The IMO and IMB have taken pains to set forth guidance for
the use of force on board a merchant vessel as a counter-piracy
measure. They have shown that it is necessary to make a risk
assessment, a sample of which is set forth in the IMO information
circulars.194 It is necessary to have rules for the use of force,
which the IMO has also set forth. It has also been shown that
various states have regulations regarding carrying guns aboard
ships while in port or in transit through their territorial waters.
Other states do not.195 There is a myriad of possibilities regarding
legal problems, but they tend to be overlooked because of the
unexpectedly high success rate that the private security guards
have brought to merchant vessels traveling through perilous waters
off the coast of Somalia.19 6 One can ask whether it is truly worth
the cost when there is such a potential for the use of excessive
force. On the other hand, the hostages that have been held captive,
sometimes for years, in different parts of Somalia, and their
families, would likely say that it is more than worth the cost. This
Article has set forth the potential responsibilities and legal
obligations, but the question remains whether the rules of
engagement will be properly observed.

ship, possibly the crew as well. It is difficult to impose accountability on the unknown,
although, there have been instances where a fishing vessel was destroyed and it was
made known. See, e.g., Naqvi, supra note 75.
194 IMO Circular 1405, supra note 116.
195 See Piracy and Private Security: Laws and Guns, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21552553.
196 Vaidya, supranote 169; Michaels, supra note 169.
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VII. Appendix
Sample Responses By:
Denmark
Australia
For: IMO, Questionnaire On Information On Port And Coastal
State Requirements Related To Privately Contracted Armed
Security Personnel On Board Ships, MSC-FAL.1/Circ.2 (Sept. 22,
2011).
QUESTIONNAIRE ON INFORMATION ON PORT AND
COASTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO
PRIVATELY
CONTRACTED
ARMED
SECURITY
PERSONNEL ON BOARD SHIPS (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.2)
1. Requirements regarding ships intending to enter in or
depart from your ports, anchorages, roadstead or offshore
terminals when carrying firearms and/or security-related
equipment and/or PCASP
1.1 Do you require specific notification from ships intending to
enter in or depart from your ports, anchorages, roadstead or
offshore terminals?
DENMARK:
See answerfor question 1.2.
AUSTRALIA:
Yes. A range of Australian Government agencies require
information prior to, and at, entry and departure, including the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, and the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority, amongst others. Ships are also subject
to requirements under applicable international conventions to
which Australia is a signatory. Information required by these
agencies may include details on arrival and departure of all
personnel, crew, firearms, weapons and other security-related
equipment.
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1.2 Do you require information regarding flag State
authorization for use of PCASP and/or the firearms and/or the
security-related equipment for use by the PCASP from ships
intending to enter in or depart from your ports, anchorages,
roadstead or offshore terminals?
DENMARK:
According to Section 1 of the Weapons and Explosives Act
firearms and ammunition may not be imported into Danish
territory without a license or authorizationfrom the Ministry of
Justice or the police.
According to Section 2 of the Weapons and Explosives Act
possession of firearms and ammunition requires a license or
authorizationfrom the Ministry ofJustice.
According to Section 6 of the act a license or authorization is
also requiredfor exportingfirearms, ammunition and equipment
for warfare out of Danish territory. The issuing of an export
license requires among other things certain documentation,
including an import license, or a declarationfrom the regulatory
authority in the recipient country to the effect that it has no
objection to the issuing of an export license.
AUSTRALIA:
Yes, information regarding authorisation may be required
under certain circumstances.For example, if export permission of
firearms is required, information on the flag state must be
provided as part of the address details of the consignor in its
applicationto the Defence Export Control Office.
1.3 Do you require specific notification regarding firearms for
use by the PCASP carried on board ships intending to enter in
or depart from your ports, anchorages, roadstead or offshore
terminals?
DENMARK:
See answerfor question 1.2.
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AUSTRALIA:

Yes, notification may form part of the information requiredby
Australian Government agencies. For example, the Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service may require specific

details offirearms, ammunition and related equipment, as well as
justificationfor carriage.
1.4 Do you require specific notification regarding securityrelated equipment for use by the PCASP carried on board
ships intending to enter in or depart from your ports,
anchorages, roadstead or offshore terminals?
DENMARK:

No, only if the security-related equipment is designed for
warfare.
AUSTRALIA:

Yes, notification may form part of the information requiredby
Australian Government agencies. For example, the Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service may require specific
details offirearms, ammunition and related equipment, as well as
justificationfor carriage.
1.5 Do you require specific notification regarding PCASP
carried on board ships intending to enter in or depart from
your ports, anchorages, roadstead or offshore terminals?
DENMARK:

No.
AUSTRALIA:

Notification may form part of the information required by
Australian Government agencies. For example, PCASP are
required to hold an appropriate visa (for example, a maritime
crew visa, transit visa, visitor visa, business (short stay) visa, or
temporary business (long stay) visa), and meet all the entry,
departureand notificationconditions attached to that visa.
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1.6 What requirements, if any, do you have in place for ships
carrying firearms and/or the security-related equipment for
use by the PCASP or PGASP when transiting through your
territorial seas and/or contiguous zones before arrival in or
after departure from your ports, anchorages, roadstead or
offshore terminals?
DENMARK:
A transit is consideredto be an importfollowed by an export.
See answerfor question 1.2.
AUSTRALIA:
Obligations (for example, for notification, authorisation or
storage) may be imposed by a number of Australian Government
agencies, including the Australian Customs andBorder Protection
Service and the Defence Export Control Office. Notification is
often requiredin advance, and should be provided directly to the
relevant agency.
2 Requirements regarding ships intending to enter in or
depart from your ports, anchorages, roadstead or offshore
terminals for the purpose of embarkin2 or disembarking
firearms and/or security-related equipment and/or PCASP.
2.1 Do you allow the embarkation or disembarkation of
firearms and/or the security-related equipment for use by the
PCASP or of PGASP in your ports, anchorages, roadstead or
offshore terminals or elsewhere in your territorial sea(s)?
DENMARK:
See answerfor question 1.2.
AUSTRALIA:
It is a criminal offence for a person to have a weapon in their
possession in a maritime security zone without authorisation or
writtenpermission by relevant Australian Government agencies.
The embarkation/disembarkationof firearms and/or security
related equipment is treated as the importation/exportation of
goods, and is subject to all applicable Australian laws (including

2014

PRIVATE SECURITY & PIRACY

1063

State and Territory laws) in this regard Further information can
be obtainedfrom the Australian Customs and Border Protection
Service, the Defence Export Control Office, and other relevant
agencies as required
2.2 Do you require information regarding flag State
authorization for use of PCASP and/or the firearms and/or the
security-related equipment for use by the PCASP from ships
intending to enter in or depart from your ports for the
purpose of embarking or disembarking firearms and/or the
security-related equipment for use by the PCASP or PCASP?
DENMARK:

See answerfor question 1.2.
AUSTRALIA:

Yes. A range of Australian Government agencies require
information prior to, and at, entry and departure at Australian
ports. Information regardingauthorisationmay be requiredunder
certain circumstances. The embarkation/disembarkation of
firearms and/or security related equipment is treated as the
importation/exportationof goods, and is subject to all applicable
Australian laws (including State and Territory laws) in this
regard.Further information can be obtainedfrom the Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service, the Defence Export
Control Office and other relevant agencies as required
2.3 What requirements, if any, do you have in place in
connection with the import or arrival in and/or export or
departure from your territory of firearms and/or securityrelated equipment for use by PCASP?
DENMARK:

See answerfor question 1.2.
AUSTRALIA:

The importation/exportation of firearms and/or securityrelated equipment to andfrom Australia is governed by a number
of Australian laws, including the Customs (ProhibitedImports)
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Regulations 1956. Australian State or Territory laws may also be
applicable. Applications for import/export are often required in
advance, and can be made directly to the relevant department.
2.4 What requirements, if any, do you have in place in
connection with the storage, security or control of the firearms
and/or security-related equipment for use by the PGASP prior
to their embarkation or after their disembarkation?
DENMARK:
Firearms and ammunition when in Denmark must be stored
responsibly and where there is no accessfor unauthorizedpersons
according to Section 21 of the Government Order on Weapons and
Ammunition. Firearmsmust also be stored in a secure cabinetfor
weapons.
AUSTRALIA:
Storage and control of firearms and security-related
equipment is subject to a range of security and safety regulations.
Possession and storage requirements are potentially subject to
both Commonwealth and State and Territory legislation. Advice
should be sought directly from the relevant Commonwealth and
State and Territory agencies, including the Australian Customs
andBorder ProtectionService.
2.5 What requirements, if any, do you have in place in
connection with the storage, security or control of the firearms
and/or security-related equipment carried on board for use by
the PCASP after their embarkation or prior to their
disembarkation, when the ship is in your port, anchorage,
roadstead or territorial waters?
DENMARK:
If the local police suspects an infringement of the storage rules
they can conduct a search of the premises where the weapons are
stored.
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AUSTRALIA:
Storage and control of firearms and security-related
equipment is subject to a range of security and safety regulations.
Possession and storage requirements are potentially subject to
both Commonwealth and State and Territory legislation. Advice
should be sought directly from the relevant Commonwealth and
State and Territory agencies, including the Australian Customs
and Border ProtectionService.
2.6 What requirements, if any, do you have in place for ships
carrying firearms and/or the security-related equipment for
use by the PCASP or of PGASP (which they have embarked
your anchorages, roadstead or offshore terminals) when
transiting through your territorial seas and/or contiguous
zones after departure from your ports, anchorages, roadstead
or offshore terminals?
DENMARK:
See answerfor question 2.5.
AUSTRALIA:
A range of security and safety regulations may apply. For
example, vessels departingfrom ports and remaining in Australian
territorialwaters may be subject to ongoing Commonwealth and
State and Territory requirements in relation to the storage,
security or licensing of firearms and/or security-related
equipment.
3 Reporting of security-related incidents in territorial seas.
3.1 What do you consider to constitute a security incident in
your territorial sea(s)?
DENMARK:
Any suspicious act or circumstancethreatening the security of
a SOLAS ship, MODU, high-speed craft or portfacility.
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AUSTRALIA:
Security incidents within Australia's territorialseas are both
defined by, and subject to, Commonwealth, and State and
Territory legislation. The principal Commonwealth offshore
enforcement provisionsare contained in the:
* Customs Act 1901;
* Migration Act 1958;
* QuarantineAct 1908;
* FisheriesManagement Act 1991;
* Environmental
Protection
and
Biodiversity
ConservationAct 1999;
* Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security
Act 2003;
* Defence Act 1903 (Offshore Division - Part 111AAA);
* Crimes Act 1914; and or Crimes (Ships and Fixed
Platforms) Act 1992.
A number of other Acts also deal with enforcement,
management and regulation of activities within Australia's
maritime domain. Various, and sometimes differing, State and
Territory laws also apply within to the territorialseas and would
need to be consideredin defining a security incident.
3.2 Do you require information regarding security-related
incidents occurring in your territorial sea(s)?
DENMARK:
Dependent on the nature of the incident, the Master or PFSO
shall decide on whether to report it to the localpolice.
AUSTRALIA:
Yes. A number of Commonwealth, State and Territory laws
and regulations, including the Maritime Transport and Offshore
Facilities Security Act 2003, require the reporting of securityrelated incidents.

